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The United States remains the only global superpower, but domestic division 
linked to partisan politics and the “culture wars” opposing secular liberals to 
religious conservatives is undermining the strength upon which U.S. supremacy 
ultimately rests. Recent decades have witnessed the failure of mainstream politi-
cal traditions to craft a common vision around which the country can rally in 
order to flourish at home and act as a force for good abroad. The neoconservative 
dream of turning the Religious Right from a “moral majority” into a permanent 
political hegemony failed amid the ruins of military adventures and the worst 
economic crisis since 1929–32. But neither Clinton nor Obama managed to offer 
a genuine alternative to the Republican-inspired settlement that was first ushered 
in by Nixon and then developed by Reagan, i.e., foreign military intervention and 
the complicit convergence of “big government” with “big business”—whose twin 
failure is now manifest for all to see.1
In the United States and the rest of the world, there is a still a common misper-
ception that Democrats are progressive while Republicans are conservative. 
While there might be some truth to this, it is arguably the case that both are fun-
damentally liberal. Beginning with the 1960s, they have progressively embraced 
social-cultural and economic-political liberalism. Neocons, Tea Party militants, 
and conservative Democrats will strenuously deny this characterization and pro-
fess their traditionalist credentials. But both the Republican and the Democratic 
establishment have implemented policies of liberalization, notably the extension 
of commercial contracts into hitherto non-monetized areas of human activity and 
1. Whatever the Republican rhetoric on “small government,” the fact is that expand-
ing the military consolidates the joint warfare and welfare state, as the U.S. military is a 
welfare state within the welfare state. Likewise, extending the “free market” gives the 
federal government more regulatory and other power, leaving the weight of the state in the 
economy fundamentally unchanged compared with the proportion since the New Deal and 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society.
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an increasingly aggressive individual rights culture, that have left U.S. society 
simultaneously more atomized and interdependent.
Instead of contesting the liberal consensus that has defined U.S. politics for 
the past forty years or so, Democrats and Republicans use the “culture wars” to 
deflect from the growing disconnect between the governing elites and the people, 
condemning the United States to partisan paralysis and an institutional stalemate 
that merely perpetuate the settlement that both sides secretly support.2
Lasting political change will only come from genuine cultural renaissance 
and religious renewal. Sustained Catholic immigration from Central and Latin 
America has already transformed the demographic landscape, with the tradition-
ally dominant WASP population now in a numerical minority that has so far 
prevented an intellectual revival and instead reinforced a siege mentality—the 
so-called “angry white men” in the Midwest on whose support the GOP has relied 
for too long.
But perhaps even more important than the growing Catholic influence linked 
to the Hispanics is the emergence of the “new evangelicals,” as Professor Marcia 
Pally shows in her eponymous book. Indeed, large sections of U.S. evangelicals 
are developing a kind of post-liberal vision that seeks to transform modern secu-
lar politics and economics. Until the First World War and again during the civil 
rights movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s, they were in fact politically 
progressive. As Pally argues, evangelicalism has nearly always been anti-elitist, 
anti-authoritarian, economically more egalitarian (against corporate banking and 
wealthy landlords), and socially interventionist on behalf of the common good—
running social programs for the poor, vastly expanding popular institutions like 
the U.S. Postal Service, and providing some of the earliest critique of laissez-faire 
capitalism (while being committed to a free market economy).
Pally’s brilliant book is both a tour d’horizon and a tour de force. She pro-
vides not just the best analytical overview of the vast and complex evangelical 
landscape across the United States but also links this to some of the most impor-
tant U.S. debates on politics and religion, notably the myth that the Religious 
Right speaks for America’s evangelicals—championing neoliberalism, milita-
rism, and theocracy. Her argument that the “new evangelicals” break away from 
this association and renew their own progressive tradition suggests that U.S. 
evangelicalism cannot be mapped on the secular spectrum of the liberal left vs. 
the conservative right. Thus, the “new evangelical” blending of greater economic 
egalitarianism with a new social conservatism illustrates how post-liberal politics 
straddles the divide between the purely religious and the exclusively secular in the 
direction of the common good.
2. On the foundations and meaning of the “culture wars,” see my debate with Luciano 
Pellicani in Telos 162 (Spring 2013), pp. 151–63 and 164–76.
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The book features a series of interviews with grassroots’ activists and the 
leadership of the “new evangelicals.” These structured conversations frame the 
narrative and also anchor the argument in really existing communities that operate 
largely outside partisan politics and the obscurity of much academic discourse. 
This, coupled with Pally’s impressive interdisciplinary scholarship, produces an 
account of compelling clarity and prescience.
The prologue that consists of fascinating interviews with two “ordinary” 
evangelicals sets the tone of the whole book. One of the great merits of Pally’s 
book is that it accurately reflects the reality on the ground and lets the “new evan-
gelicals” speak for themselves. From the outset, this approach is able to dispel 
several myths about the evangelical tradition—whether an obsession with indi-
vidual salvation that distracts from the practice of charity vis-à-vis people of all 
faiths and none or a simplistic moralism of good vs. evil that fuels the crusade of 
the Religious Right in the name of some imagined “Moral Majority.”
As Pally indicates, the term “new evangelicals” was first coined by Rich-
ard Cizik, the former vice president at the National Association of Evangelicals 
(NAE), who refers to those “evangelicals whose priorities have broadened from 
those associated with the Religious Right—a broadening toward an anti-militarist, 
anti-consumerist focus on poverty relief, immigration reform, and environmental 
protection” (17). Instead of “bible-bashing” proselytism, these evangelicals seek 
to defend the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom for all believers while 
also accepting the political framework of liberal democracy in relation to people 
of no faith at all. As such, they are committed to a politics of the common good that 
upholds “human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and peacemaking, including 
peace and respect among the world’s religions” (19). Far from imposing a theo-
cratic system through the back door, the “new evangelicals” support pluralism, 
economic justice, and the constitutional rule of liberal-democratic government.
In the introduction, Pally addresses head-on the key question of what 
prompted the evangelical breakaway from the Religious Right and suggests three 
factors: first, generational shifts that have led young evangelicals to reject their 
parents’ right-wing politics and the “prosperity gospel” that legitimated neoliber-
alism; second, cultural and attitudinal changes connected with personal morality 
(including sex), global poverty, and climate change; third, communal conscience 
and the realization (long before the 2008 Republican defeat) that the Religious 
Right betrayed most of the fundamental principles such as love of others, service 
to the community, and a universal covenant beyond class, culture, and even creed. 
For these and other reasons, “new evangelicalism” marks a return to a progressive 
tradition.
Part one, covering chapters one to five, focuses on the complex ties between 
Church and State in the evangelical tradition. Pally traces evangelicalism to 
its roots in the movement of the dissenters who defended the twin principles 
182  ADRIAN PABST
of freedom of conscience and state-church separation, not forced conversion 
or theocracy. So from the outset, evangelicals tended to be “individualist, anti-
authoritarian, and suspicious of government” (46), which based on their European 
experience they associated with ecclesial subordination to the sovereign and state 
religion (cuius regio eius religio). 
Over time, this doctrinal commitment to freedom of conscience and state-
church separation favored the disestablishment of religion at the state level and the 
emergence of evangelical associations, which became the backbone of America’s 
civil society and inspired a whole host of socioeconomic activities—including 
extending free public education, opposing slavery (in the North), and building the 
country’s infrastructure (such as the U.S. Postal Service). In turn, Pally’s book 
shows—more than any other existing account—that this evolution in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries gave rise to the evangelical championing of civil 
society as the primary locus of religion, politics, and the economy—an alternative 
to the growing divide between privatized apolitical faith, on the one hand, and 
theocratic flirtations with state religion and absolute power, on the other hand.
The early twentieth century saw a move away from the Social Gospel in 
the direction of the “prosperity gospel” that wrongly equated the elect with the 
rich and legitimated the secular pursuit of both power and wealth. At the same 
time, other strands of evangelicalism (such as millenarians, dispensationalists, 
and the adherents of the so-called Holiness doctrine) inaugurated a shift from a 
this-worldly concern with society (in particular the poor and excluded) to an oth-
erworldly obsession with individual salvation and the Kingdom of God in heaven. 
But as the forces of secular modernity tightened their grip over U.S. soci-
ety, evangelicals who had been part of a progressive tradition found themselves 
increasingly on the reactionary side of the new divide opposing conservatives to 
the permissive culture of “hippies and yippies” (57). Hence the success of figures 
such as Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham. Faced with the ever-expanding federal 
government and central intrusion in the private sphere, evangelicals felt that their 
spirit of individualist, anti-authoritarian self-reliance was under threat and so was 
the very foundation of the U.S. Constitution. That sealed the alliance between 
the evangelicals and the Republicans to form the New Right in the 1970s: “from 
the 1980s on, the Religious Right sought government support for religious prac-
tice—such as prayers in the schools—in public institutions. It relied on the state 
to institutionalize religious values, such as teaching creationism in public schools, 
and thus it invited some church intermingling—which is forbidden in order to 
protect freedom of religion” (93).
By contrast, the “new evangelicals” reject this politicization of faith and the 
Religious Right’s theocratic outlook that informed much of neoconservatism. 
The alternative they promote is “robust religion within liberal democracy”—
the title of the book’s second part, which covers chapters six to nine. Based 
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on her interview with Richard Cizik, Pally reports one of the key findings of 
her research—namely, that the “new evangelicalism” marks a rupture with the 
divisive and angry approach of the Religious Right in favor of a loving, heal-
ing partnership that refuses to serve partisan politics. For example, on abortion, 
maternal health, and teenage pregnancy, he advocates a shift from a punitive to a 
restorative approach that protects the dignity of the person and is in line with the 
common good. Linked to this is a broadening of evangelical concerns from abor-
tion, civil partnerships (though not gay marriage), electoral wins, and Christian 
fundamentalism to poverty relief, immigration reform, environmental steward-
ship, and inter-faith engagement. This is evinced by various initiatives to reduce 
third world debt, support diplomatic solutions to conflict, and build bridges with 
the Muslim world. 
Interestingly, the “new evangelicals” bring together figures from across the 
religious and political spectrum—from the more progressive Jim Wallis (founder 
of Sojourners) via the moderate Leith Anderson (president of the National 
Association of Evangelicals) to the more conservative Rick Warren (pastor at 
the influential Saddleback Church, with over 100,000 members, who gave the 
invocation at Obama’s first presidential inauguration). What binds them and the 
countless other evangelicals leaders and members together is a shared belief in 
the prophetic role of the church (“speaking truth to power”) and ecclesial involve-
ment in economic, social, cultural, and environmental issues.
Family planning and abortion is a case in point: instead of being judgmen-
tal and condemning individual behavior as immoral, the “new evangelicals” are 
pragmatic about contraception and offer pre- and post-natal support for young 
women who are “pregnant, broke, and scared not to have an abortion” (141). So 
the aim is to reduce both the number of unwanted pregnancies and the cases of 
abortion by forging partnerships between churches and other organizations that 
can provide universal, unconditional support.
Whether with or without state involvement, the “new evangelicals” have not 
just abandoned the “prosperity gospel” but have also developed the meaning of 
the Social Gospel by extending church involvement: ministries run by evangelical 
pastors such as the Minnesota-based Gregory Boyd include “food and clothing for 
the poor, job-skills development, job-transition help, emergency financial grants, 
English as a second language, substance abuse programs, gay-lesbian-bisexual-
transgender support, counseling, youth programs, making life more Jesus-like, 
and aid to local immigrants” (153). In this manner, evangelical churches increas-
ingly fill the void that is left by both state and market—especially in the wake of 
the economic crisis and the new age of austerity.
Crucially, the “new evangelicals” do not subscribe to the binary logic of 
being either with or against government but instead engage on a policy-by-
policy basis—closer to the Republicans on abortion and fiscal conservatism but 
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opposed to them on war and their climate-change skepticism, while siding with 
the Democrats on poverty relief, free public education, and gay civil partnerships 
or even unions but rejecting federal government support for abortion and ruling 
out the redefinition of traditional marriage. As the foundation of civil society, the 
churches are extra-state and extra-market, leaving government and business to 
rule over secular affairs while the fellowship of believers prepares—and imper-
fectly embodies—the Kingdom of God on earth. 
By combining greater economic egalitarianism with a new, updated form of 
social conservatism, the “new evangelicals” are a distinct part of a wider post-
liberal movement that is beginning to take shape and redefine politics in the West.
Many questions remain over certain tensions or even contradictions within 
the evangelical tradition and its relation to U.S. politics: how do the “new evan-
gelicals” square their commitment to market individualism with the primacy of 
the person and human association, starting with the family? What explains their 
progressive conservatism and qualified support for modernization (e.g., the influ-
ence of the Methodist tradition), which contrasts sharply with the hyper-modern 
stance of many Puritans and Calvinists? How does the social relate to the sac-
ramental? Is the commitment to the common good affected by the evangelical 
ecclesiology that privileges a personal relationship with Jesus and individual sal-
vation over a communal Trinitarian vision and the anticipation of God’s kingdom 
within the universal Church?
The great merit of Pally’s work is that she sheds new light on these and other 
questions. Her book is a stunning achievement. It creatively combines fascinat-
ing interviews with a sharp analysis of history, principles, and policies. It also 
overcomes the false divide between theology and religious studies, and shows 
how the critical study of religion and politics resists the easy categorization of 
secularization vs. de-secularization. The book confirms Pally as one of the most 
significant contemporary scholars in the field of politics and religion. Her work 
is prescient and lays the foundation for further significant research that she is 
currently undertaking on theologies of relationality and the modern tension of 
“separability” versus “situatedness.” This conceptual innovation will undoubt-
edly transform our understanding of political religion and religious politics.
